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ABSTRACT
This paper empirically tests the theoretical model developed by Aggarwal, Krigman
and Womack (2001), which argues that insiders of a firm strategically underprice its initial
public offering to maximize personal wealth by selling shares at lockup expiration. First day
underpricing generates information momentum for the stock in terms of increased research
coverage and recommendations by analysts. Increased research coverage is positively
correlated with stock returns and insider selling at the end of the lockup period. Although the
value of the stock should be typically based on discounted expected future cash flows, several
empirical papers suggest a downward sloping demand curves for new issues (Kaul, Mehrotra
and Morck 2000, Field and Hanka 2000), consistent with the assumption of this paper’s
empirical model. The hypothesis is tested using a sample of 210 internet-based firms such as
Social media platforms, online travel agents, online real-estate agents and E-commerce
services. The empirical results are significant and consistent with the hypothesis.
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SECTION I: INTRODUCTION
An Initial Public Offering (IPO) is the first time the stock of a private company is
offered to the public. The proceeds of its sale are used by the company as capital for funding
future growth. While interning for a Wealth Management firm over the summer, I observed
that clients would often call in and take buy or sell suggestions for newly listed public firms.
Since the firm I was interning with was situated in the heart of Silicon Valley, these questions
would usually pertain to Technology or Internet-based startup firms, especially firms that
were priced low. This led to me to look further into IPO pricing trends and literature, and
motivated me to write this thesis.
In an IPO, the issuer typically obtains the assistance of an underwriting firm, which
helps determine what type of security to issue, the best offering price, the amount of shares to
be issued, timing of the offering and the lockup period. Underpricing refers to the pricing of
the initial offering below its market value, and is calculated as the return from offer price to
close price on first day of trading. A lockup period is a predetermined amount of time
following an IPO where large shareholders, such as company executives are restricted from
selling their shares, lasting for six months on an average. In a survey of Chief Financial
Officers (CFOs) that took their firms public, Krigman, Shaw and Womack (2001) find that
the CFOs of most underpriced firms are highly satisfied with the performance of their lead
IPO Underwriter. Issuing owner-managers seem unconcerned about situations of extreme
underpricing, even though substantial proceeds are forgone.
So why are IPOs underpriced? Over the last twenty years, a plethora of literature has
been published on reasons for underpricing of IPOs. The IPO Underpricing literature can be
broken into three main categories. The first category addresses underpricing in relation to
greater wealth for the firm’s initial owners, which claims that by underpricing the initial
offering, firms attract increased research coverage which in turn leads to higher returns for
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insiders selling at lockup expiration (See for example, Spiess and Pettway 1997, Rajan and
Servaes 1997, Aggarwal, et al. 2001). The second category explores the underpricing
signaling hypothesis where in a high-quality firm underprices and IPO with the expectation
that the loss can be recouped through a subsequent seasoned equity offering (SEOs) after
investors have had the opportunity to recognize the firm’s true potential (See for example
Welch 1989, Booth and Chua 1996). The third category claims that underpricing generates
increased research coverage for the firm, thereby attracting customers and increasing
fundamental value of the firm (See for example, Hakenes and Nevries 2000), which is an
extension to the underpricing signaling hypothesis.
While there have been recent papers surrounding the underpricing signaling
hypothesis, there has not been a recent study discussing the insiders’ personal wealth
maximization incentives behind underpricing. This paper addresses this gap within the
literature by analyzing data from initial public offerings of the last decade, from 2007 through
2016. Hence, this paper tests the implications outlined by Aggarwal et al. (2001) who argue
that underpricing creates information momentum, a phenomena of increased interest in the
stock, which shifts the demand curve for the firm’s stock outwards. This generates higher
prices at the lockup expiration, when managers have their first opportunity to sell shares. As a
result, managers accept substantial underpricing in order to maximize personal wealth.
Although the value of the stock should be typically based on discounted expected future cash
flows, several empirical papers suggest a downward sloping demand curves for new issues
(Kaul et. al 2000, Field and Hanka 2000), consistent with the assumption of this paper’s
empirical model.
I argue that it is important to look at data from the recent past since the IPO market is
quite dynamic in nature (Figures 1 and 2 show how number of IPOs and underpricing vary
over time). Rajan and Servaes (1997) examine the relationship between underpricing, number
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of analysts providing earnings estimates and lockup expiration returns for data between 1975
and 1987, and conclude that returns are positively related to research coverage. While Spiess
and Pettway (1997) find no evidence that an underpriced IPO leads to greater wealth for the
firm’s initial owners for data between 1987 – 1991, Aggarwal et al (2001) find contrasting
results for a period shortly thereafter (1994 – 1999). Similarly, IPO frenzy has had its ups and
downs between 2007 – 2016, especially with the financial crisis of 2008.
The data sample of this paper is restricted to the Internet industry as classified by the
Bloomberg Industry Classification Standard (BICS)1, which includes Internet-based services
including Social media platforms, Online travel agents, Online real-estate agents and Ecommerce services. Since a part of the data had to be hand-collected, this restriction was vital
due to practical considerations. Furthermore, the intuition is that substantial benefit from
underpricing can only be derived in a relatively hot IPO industry that is followed by and
invested in by a wide range of investors. The last decade saw well-known Internet based
firms such Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Etsy, Zillow going public and Alibaba setting the
record for the largest US-listed IPO. In the last ten years, Internet firms comprised of 20%
and 12% of number of initial offerings and size of initial offerings respectively; no other
industry comes as close. Moreover, while the use of stocks and options for executive
compensation varies across firms, such compensation seems particularly common in Internetbased companies (Meulbroek 2000).
The model tests the relationship between underpricing, lockup expiration returns and
lockup expiration selling through the effects of information momentum. High insider

1

Bloomberg classifies companies by tracking their primary business activities as measured by their primary
source of revenue; it then groups them together according to the end markets these businesses service. These
classifications are reviewed annually or after significant event such as an acquisition, merger, or divestiture. The
hierarchy comprises of Sector, Industry Group, and Industry, with each company being classified at the Industry
level. SIC classification was not used since SIC codes were developed for traditional industries prior to
1970. As a result, SIC has been slow to recognize new and emerging industries, such as those in the
internet and technology sectors, which are relevant to this paper.
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ownership prior to IPO results in higher underpricing, which generates significant
information momentum. By underpricing the issue, the large increase in stock price on the
first day attracts interest from research analysts and media. The enhanced coverage attracts
the attention of more investors, thereby increasing the demand for the stock. Insiders take
advantage of this additional demand while selling shares at lockup expiration. Thus,
underpricing results in increased insider wealth. The model is tested using a sample of 210
IPOs of Internet based firms, between 2007 and 2016. It is important to note that the insiders’
intentional underpricing results in an opportunity cost to the firm in terms of forgone
proceeds from the IPO. Ritter (1991) points out that these forgone proceeds lead to long-run
underperformance. In this paper, the insider trades off benefits of information momentum
against the opportunity cost of the forgone proceeds for the firm.
Agarwal et al (2001) examined IPO data in the years leading up to the dotcom bubble
crash, where more than 50% underpricing was quite common. Although 2007 – 2016 was
not a period of extreme underpricing, the results of this paper are consistent with Rajan and
Servaes (1997) and Agarwal et al (2001). Firms in which insiders hold a high number of
shares and options have greater first-day underpricing. Firms with greater first-day
underpricing receive substantially more recommendations from research analysts in the
months leading up to the lockup expiration. Finally, increased research coverage from
analysts leads to higher stock prices and greater insider selling at lockup expiration.
This paper consists of the following sections. Section II describes the data sources, the
sample and its characteristics. Section III presents the empirical model and results. Sections
IV and V discuss the shortcomings and conclude the paper respectively.
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SECTION II: DATA AND DATA SOURCES2
Internet-based IPOs in 2007 through 2016 listed on a United States Exchange were
examined, a period during which 53% of the firms had more than 15% first-day underpricing.
The Bloomberg Industry Classification Standard (BICS) served as a reference to narrowing
down the sample to Internet-based firms, comprising of online travel agents, social media, ecommerce firms and so on. The data comes from several sources. Bloomberg’s IPO database
is used for data on characteristics of the IPO: Effective Offer Date, Offer Price, Offer Size,
Number of Primary and Secondary Shares offered in the IPO, Venture Capital (VC) Backed,
Private Equity (PE) Backed, VC Exit, PE Exit, and Lockup Expiry date. The data on insider
ownership pre-IPO was hand collected from the S-1 form, a Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) registration filing used by companies intending to go public. The S-1
form was used to gather data on number of executives and directors with insider ownership,
executive stock ownership as a percentage of shares outstanding and executive options
ownership as a percentage of shares outstanding. The following positions are included in the
definition of an insider: Chairman of Board, President, Chief Executive Officer, Chief
Financial Officer, Vice President, General Partner, Officer, Director, Chief Accounting
Officer, and Controlling Person. Ang and Brau (2003) study concealment strategies by
insiders and state that they underreport the number of personally owned shares in the original
S-1, and instead use an obscure amendment to communicate the true higher level; hence, the
most recent amendment of the S-1 was used to gather the required data for this paper.
First day underpricing defined as the return from the offer price to close price of first
day of trading is calculated using security prices data from the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) database. CRSP database is also used to examine returns between the
IPO and lockup expiration. The theoretical model developed by Aggarwal et al (2001)

2

A detailed list of variables and descriptions is available in Appendix I.
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predicts that underpricing generates information momentum. In this paper, Research Analyst
reports are used as a proxy for information momentum. The Institutional Brokers’ Estimate
System (IBES) database available through the Wharton Research Data Services is used to
identify the timing and quantity of research recommendations of firms in the Bloomberg IPO
dataset. The data on number of buy, hold and sell recommendations as well as number of
analysts tracking the IPO from the effective date of the IPO through one month following the
expiration of the lockup provision is collected.
The Thompson Reuters Insider trading database is used to identity insider sales
around lockup expiration. This database has the transaction details of all insider filings
received by the SEC beginning in 1986. The definition of insiders remains consistent from
pre-IPO insider ownership. The transactions are dated and coded by the type of transaction.
They also contain the name and position of insider, the number of shares, and the transaction
price. Insider selling data two months prior to two months following the lockup expiration
date is collected, since selling prior to the expiration of the lockup is permitted with written
consent of the lead underwriter. However, most underwriters do not choose to waive lockup
periods early since the Financial Industrial Regulatory Authority (FINRA) mandates a public
disclosure of the same (Rule 5131). In certain instances, where an early lock-up release
permitted insiders to sell into the market, shareholders (public investors) have sought to bring
a class action in connection with losses suffered as a result of the drop in the issuer’s stock
price.
Finally, several control variables are included in the empirical model. An indicator
variable for a subsequent equity offering for each firm is included. This data is available on
Bloomberg. The name of the lead underwriter, number of co-managers, and executive
compensation packages were compiled from the most recent amendment of the S-1 form. The
lead underwriter ranking is based on the adjusted Carter-Manaster rankings from Jay Ritter’s
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IPO data3 (Carter and Manaster 1990). All other returns, market capitalization post-IPO and
trading volume data is captured from the CRSP database.
Tables 1 and 2 contain summary statistics of the primary data sample. In the sample,
153 IPOs, or 73% of the sample are between calendar years 2011 – 2014. This can be
explained by the occurrence of the 2008 financial crisis, and the subsequent take-off of the
market post crisis. IPO markets in 2008 and 2009 were duller compared to the rest of the time
periods in the sample, accounting for only 3% of the sample. Hence, the changes in the IPO
marker through time are controlled for in the empirical analysis. In Table 1, the average
offering size of the IPO is $320 million, with a mean offering price of $10.22 per share. The
distribution for size of offering is quite skewed with a mean of $320 million and median of
$62.30 million. This can be attributed to the presence of certain high profile and large IPOs in
the sample by firms such as Facebook and Alibaba ($16 billion and $25 billion offer sizes
respectively). The mean underpricing (measured as offer to first day close) is 29.3% and the
median is 17.2%. This is significantly lower when Agarwal et. al (2001) findings, which is
not surprising considering that their period of study (1994 – 1999) constituted of extreme
underpricing. In this sample only 28% of the firms sold secondary shares. 36% of the
offerings were backed by Venture Capitalists and 33% were backed by Private Equity firms
at some point in time. In 29% and 16% of the firms, the exit, or in this case the initial public
offering was carried out under the guidance of a Venture Capitalist and Private Equity firm
respectively. Unlike Venture Capital firms which typically invest minority stakes in early
stage companies with proprietary technology, Buyout or Private Equity firms invest majority
stakes in mature companies. Hence, the difference in preferences are controlled for in the
empirical analysis by including VC and PE Indicator variables. The mean rank of the Lead
Underwriter was 5.7, measured on a scale of 1.1 to 9.1, with the assistance from an average

3

https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/
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of 1.89 co-managers. A majority of the firms (75%) in the sample have a lockup period of
180 days, a standard practice in the IPO market.
Panel A of Table 2 comprises of details of insider ownership prior to the initial public
offering. On average, managers hold 58% of stock and 6% of options as a percentage of
shares outstanding. Venture capitalists, Angel investors, Buyout firms, Non-management
employees and others hold the rest. The high stock ownership is common in Internet-based
firms. While the percentage of options ownership is lower for the industry, it is common for
startups to have limited options since they are not well-established in the market. Panel B of
Table 2 contains the summary statistics on Research coverage. In the sample, 8% of firms
have no research coverage from the time of the IPO until one month after the expiration of
the lockup period. For firms with research coverage, the mean number of analysts making
recommendations is 6.08. This is significantly higher than Agarwal et. al (2001) findings, and
can be attributed to the fact that internet firms receive more coverage in general. Each IPO
with Research Coverage was mentioned 52.9 times on average. Panel C of Table 2 provides a
summary on insider selling around the lockup expiration. In the sample, 91% of the firms
have insider selling in the period two months prior to two months following the lockup
expiration with an average of 9.58% of shares outstanding sold; 5% of these firms have
insider selling prior to lockup expiration with an average of 6.89% of shares outstanding sold.
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SECTION III: EMPIRICAL MODEL, RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The Empirical Model tests four assumptions as outlined by Agarwal et al (2001), which
suggest that underpricing affects lockup expiration returns and insider selling through the
effects of information momentum. The first implication is that higher insider ownership prior
to initial offering leads to greater underpricing. The second claim that is empirically tested is
whether high first day underpricing generates information momentum in the form of greater
levels of research coverage by analysts. Then, the model estimates if increased research
coverage leads to higher returns at the expiration of lockup. The fourth and final implication
is if the number of shares sold by insiders around the expiration of lockup is increasing with
research coverage.
In order to determine if high insider ownership prior to IPO leads to greater
underpricing, the following linear model is estimated:
y"# = α + βx"# + µ# + ϵ"#
where 𝑦-. is a measure of underpricing, that is, the offer price to close return on the offering’s
first day. 𝑥-. is a vector of independent variables that includes insider stock and options
ownership measured as a percentage of outstanding stock, secondary shares measured as a
percentage of total shares offered in the IPO, Log of Offer Size, Lead IPO underwriter rank,
Number of co-managers, and Indicator variables for VC backed firms, PE backed firms, and
Subsequent equity offerings. A calendar year indicator 𝜇. is included to control for any time
effects and changes in the IPO and financial markets, especially financial crisis of 2008. 𝜖-. is
the error term with the usual properties. The independent variables of interest are insider
stock and options ownership measured as a percentage of outstanding stock, and secondary
shares measured as a percentage of total shares offered in the IPO. Since, Secondary Shares
in contrast to Primary shares refer to shares of existing shareholders that are sold to investors
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in an offering, intuitively, high percentage of Secondary shares in an IPO should result in
lower underpricing.
The size of the offering is controlled by including Log of Offer Size and quality of
offering is controlled by including the rank of the Lead IPO underwriter and number of comanagers. Higher quality offerings are underwritten by higher quality investment banks, and
that higher quality investment banks have greater market share in terms of IPO proceeds
raised (Megginson and Weiss 1991). Hence, higher the quality of the underwriter, lower the
incentive of underwriter to underprice the IPO. Indicator variables for VC and PE backed
firms are also included (VC Backed, VC Exit, PE Backed, PE Exit). Unlike venture firms
which typically invest a minority stake in early-stage companies with proprietary technology,
buyout or PE firms invest majority stakes in mature companies. This might result in
significant differences that arise in underwriting due to the difference in investment strategies
and level of involvement of the pre-IPO investor. The underpricing signaling hypotheses
(Welch 1989) is controlled for by including an indicator variable for follow-on or subsequent
equity offerings. The results are contained in Table 3.
The first regression leads to notable findings. Consistent with the literature (Rajan and
Servaes 1997, Aggarwal et al 2001), Underpricing is positively correlated with Insider stock
ownership. Intuitively, options ownership should follow the same relation as stock ownership
with underpricing. On the other hand, Secondary shares sold in an IPO should have an
inverse relationship with underpricing, since secondary shares are shares of the insiders and
other existing stockholders sold in the IPO. While Insider options ownership and Secondary
shares sold in the offering are positively and negatively correlated with Underpricing
respectively in the estimates, their coefficients are insignificant. This could be attributed to
the fact that a lower proportion of firms in the sample had insider options ownership (6% of
total sample) and secondary shares (28% of total sample) sold in the IPO. Overall, the results
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are consistent with the implication that managers with larger holdings are willing to
underprice more. While the economic significance of this effect is larger compared to the
Agarwal et al (2001) findings, the effect still remains minimal; an increase of 10% in insider
stock ownership is associated with a 4.4% increase in underpricing.
The second implication of the model tests whether higher first day underpricing leads
to greater levels of research coverage in the form of frequents mentions in the IBES
Database. As an initial investigation of the above implication, the sample is partitioned into
four groups based on Aggarwal et al (2001) IPO underpricing cutoff levels; Cold IPOs have
an underpricing of 0% or below, Cool IPOs are underpriced between 0 – 10%, Hot IPOs are
underpriced between 10 – 60% and extra-hot IPOs have an underpricing greater than 60%. In
Table 4, consistent with the findings of Rajan and Servaes (1997), the number of time the
stock was mentioned in the IBES database is increasing with the level of underpricing.
In order to formally test if first day underpricing leads to greater number of mentions
in the IBES Database, a Heckman two-stage model is estimated (Heckman 1979). The first
stage is designed to explain why IBES has no research coverage for certain firms. As noted
by the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) portal, WRDS had recently discontinued
the First Call Research Coverage database and merged it with the IBES Estimates. Hence, the
lack of research coverage data in the sample is probably due to IBES database missing data in
the data merging process, rather than no research coverage occurring. The second stage
estimates the impact of underpricing on research coverage, after correcting for potential
selection bias.
The first stage is a probit model as outlined below.
Stage 1 ∶ y"# = α + βx"# + µ# + ϵ"#
where 𝑦-. is an indicator for a firm’s mention in the IBES Database, equaling 1 if the
firm was even mentioned from the time of the IPO through one month following the lockup
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expiration period, or 0 otherwise. 𝑥-. is a vector of independent variables that Log of Market
Capitalization measured four weeks following the IPO, Lead Underwriter rank, and Indicator
variables for VC and PE backed firms. A calendar year indicator 𝜇. is included to control for
any time effects and changes in the IPO and financial markets. 𝜖-. is the error term with the
usual properties.
The second stage is a linear estimation as outlined below:
Stage 2: y"# = α + βx"# + γ(Inverse mills ratio) + µ# + ϵ"#
where 𝑦-. is Research Coverage, defined as the total number of mentions in the IBES
database from the time of the IPO through one month following the lockup expiration period.
𝑥-. is a vector of independent variables that includes underpricing, underpricing squared, Log
of Market Capitalization measured four weeks following the IPO, Lead Underwriter rank,
Number of Co-Managers, Turnover (measured as the average amount of trading volume in
the first month as a percentage of shares offered in the IPO), and Indicators for VC and PE
backed firms. The inverse mills ratio estimated in the first stage is also included as an
independent variable. A calendar year indicator 𝜇. is included to control for any time effects
and changes in the IPO and financial markets. 𝜖-. is the error term with the usual properties.
The independent variables of interest are Underpricing and Underpricing squared. The
Underpricing squared term is included to test for concavity in the relationship between
underpricing and information coverage as outlined by the theoretical model in Aggarwal et al
(2001). A control of Number of co-Managers is added since IPOs with higher number of CoManagers might have increased marketing efforts and roadshows, thereby receiving greater
coverage. A variable for Turnover is also included, measured as the average amount of
trading volume in the first month as a percentage of shares offered in the IPO to control for
the possibility that greater volume leads to greater research coverage. The first stage is
estimated with the full sample of 210 firms. The second stage only includes 193 firms, which
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have some level of research coverage. The results are contained in Table 5 (Panel A and B
comprise of Heckman first and second stage results respectively).
Focusing on the second stage estimates of the Heckman analysis (Table 5, Panel B),
the number of mentions in the IBES database by research analysts following the stock is
significantly related to the level of Underpricing. These results are consistent with those in
Rajan and Servaes (1997), who find that the number of analysts providing earnings estimates
is positively associated with IPO underpricing. Consistent with the theoretical model outlined
by Agarwal et al (2001) which assumes concavity of the information momentum generating
function, the relationship between Underpricing and Research Coverage is concave, as
suggested by the positive coefficient of Underpricing and negative coefficient of
Underpricing Squared in the linear estimation. The economic significance of this estimation
is quite substantial; an increase of 1% in underpricing is associated with an additional 3.63
mentions in the IBES Database. This makes sense intuitively since the internet industry
garners more attention from analysts, in general.
In order to test if increased research coverage leads to higher returns at lockup
expiration, the following linear model is estimated:
y"# = α + βx"# + µ# + ϵ"#
where 𝑦-. is the Lockup period expiration return. 𝑥-. is a vector of independent
variables that includes Number of mentions in the IBES Database, Log of Market
Capitalization measured four weeks following the IPO, Lead Underwriter rank, Number of
Co-Managers, Indicator variables for VC and PE backed firms, Research Coverage indicator,
Underpricing, and Underpricing Squared. A calendar year indicator 𝜇. is included to control
for any time effects and changes in the IPO and financial markets. 𝜖-. is the error term with
the usual properties.
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Table 6 shows that research coverage defined as the number of mentions of the stock
by analysts from the time of the IPO to one month following the lockup expiration is positive
and significant in explaining returns at lockup period expiration. Furthermore, there is no
independent and significant effect of Underpricing on returns. This is consistent with the
hypothesis that there is no clear direct relationship between lockup expiration returns and
level of Underpricing, except through the effects of information momentum. From Table 5,
an increase of 1% in underpricing is associated with an additional 3.63 mentions in the IBES
Database, which in turn leads to an incremental return of 1% during lockup expiration.
The fourth and final implication of whether insider selling around lockup expiration is
increasing with research coverage is estimated in two ways - a Logit and a Tobit Model.
Y"# = α + βx"# + µ# + ϵ"#
In the Logit specification, 𝑦-. equals one if there are any stock sales by insiders in the
period from two months prior to two months following the lockup expiration. In the Tobit
specification, 𝑦-. is defined as the amount of stock sold by insiders in in the period two
months prior to two months following the lockup expiration as a percentage of total shares
outstanding. 𝑥-. is a vector of independent variables that includes Returns at lockup
expiration, Number of Mentions in the IBES database, Research Coverage indicator, Log of
Market Capitalization measured four weeks following the IPO, Lead Underwriter rank,
Number of Co-Managers, Indicator variables for VC and PE backed firms, Underpricing,
Underpricing Squared and a Percentage of base salary and cash bonus as a percentage of
executive compensation package. Base salary and cash bonus as a percentage of executive
compensation package is included to control for liquidity needs of insiders. As Meulbroek
(2000) points out, many managers in Internet-based firms have undiversified portfolios,
holding mainly equity of their firms. Hence, high amount of insider selling can be attributed
to lack of diversification in their portfolio and liquidity. A calendar year indicator 𝜇. is
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included to control for any time effects and changes in the IPO and financial markets. 𝜖-. is
the error term with the usual properties.
Consistent with Agarwal et. al (2001), insider selling around lockup expiration is
increasing in the number of recommendations made by analysts (Table 7). Although lockup
sales as a percentage of total shares outstanding is increasing with level of underpricing in
Table 5, Underpricing, Underpricing squared and Lockup expiration returns do not have an
independent effect on insider sales around lockup expiration according to results in Table 7.
Thus underpricing, returns and sales only operate through the effects of information
momentum. Finally, from Table 5, an increase of 1% in underpricing is associated with an
additional 3.63 mentions in the IBES Database, which in turn leads to an incremental insider
selling of 3.9% around lockup expiration.
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SECTION IV: SHORTCOMINGS
The dataset was limited by the availability of pre-IPO insider ownership data. Since
the insider stock and options ownership data prior to the initial public offering had to be hand
collected, the sample was restricted to a narrower time frame and industry. If more data was
accessible, the results could have potentially been more impactful. In the first linear
estimation of the effect of pre-IPO ownership on the degree of underpricing, a control
(indicator) variable for Subsequent Equity offerings (SEO) is included to control for the
effects of underpricing signally hypothesis. However, since a SEO can take place any time
period after the initial offering, this variable is dynamic, and is not the best representation of
whether a company chooses to make a secondary offering. It is also important to note that
certain a small proportion (7%) of IPOs in the sample were not assisted by an underwriter,
and thus were assigned a rank of zero; this might have slightly skewed the mean of
underwriter ranking. Furthermore, since a comprehensive dataset is not available for recent
rankings, this paper uses underwriter rankings as of 2003. Hence, this might have affected the
lead underwriter rankings of IPOs post 2003.
Certain companies have a staged lockup expiration process for insiders, in which a
proportion of shares remain locked in even after the first lockup expires, and can only be sold
at the second or third lockup expiration. In this paper, the model uses the first lockup
expiration as a data point while calculating lockup expiration returns and identifying insider
sales. Although this is a fair assumption, since only 2% and 1% of the firms in the sample
have a second and third lockup period respectively, it still could have potentially impaired the
insiders’ ability to sell after the first lockup expiration, thus bringing in potential biases in the
insider selling data. While adding control variables in the fourth linear estimation that could
potentially affect insider sales besides high returns at lockup expiration, the model includes
an estimate of base salary and cash bonuses as a percentage of total executive compensation
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to control for insiders’ liquidity needs. However, the model does not account for the
diversification needs of the insiders. As Meulbroek (2000) points out, insiders in Internetbased firms have largely undiversified portfolios, holding mainly the equity of their
companies. Hence, managerial selling can also be attributed to the fact that insiders do not
want to bear the full volatility of internet firms. An alternative explanation for this paper’s
findings is insider risk aversion. More risk-averse insiders would want to underprice more in
order to ensure that the IPO is successful. However, risk-averse managers would also want to
sell secondary shares in the IPO, which is not a predominant feature in this data sample (only
28% of firms sold secondary shares). While there is very weak evidence (in Table 3) that
IPOs in which insiders sell secondary shares are underpriced less, this does not seem to be a
full explanation since very few insiders sell initially.

21

SECTION V: CONCLUSION
This paper develops a model in which insiders underprice the initial public offering to
maximize personal wealth. Unlike previous literature (See for example, Spiess and Pettway
1997, Rajan and Servaes 1997, Aggarwal, Krigman and Womack 2001) which examined all
initial public offerings in a given time period, the data sample in this paper consists solely of
Internet-based firms. The data sample consists of 210 IPOs of internet-based firms spanning
the time period of 2007 to 2016. Consistent with the hypothesis, underpricing creates
information momentum, thereby generating increased returns and high selling at lockup
expiration, when insiders have the first opportunity to sell. As a result, managers accept
substantial underpricing in order to maximize personal wealth. The economic significance is
noteworthy; an increase of 1% in underpricing is associated with an incremental return of 1%
and increased insider selling of 3.9% during lockup expiration. The key condition for this
model is that the value of information momentum must be sufficiently high so as to
significantly shift out the demand curve for a new issue. Intuitively, such a condition is likely
to be met in hot IPO markets, such as internet-related firms.
The dataset was limited by the availability of pre-IPO insider ownership data. Since
the insider stock and options ownership data prior to the initial public offering had to be hand
collected, the sample was restricted to a narrower time frame and industry. If more data was
accessible, a comparative study could have been carried out to test the value of information
momentum and benefits to substantial underpricing in hot IPO markets (such as internetrelated firms) versus cold IPO markets. Intuitively, when the value of information momentum
is low, in industries that are not perceived to be hot, there should be little benefit to
substantial underpricing.
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Figure 1:
Number of Initial Public Offerings and Average First-day Underpricing
1980 – 2016 (Source: Jay Ritter’s IPO Data)4

4

https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/
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Figure 2
Number of Initial Public Offerings (Total and Internet based firms) 1980 –
2016 (Source: Jay Ritter’s IPO Data5 and Bloomberg)
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Internet based IPOs

Table 1:
Summary Statistics of IPO Data
The sample consists of 210 firms that completed an initial public offering (IPO) between January 2007
and December 2016. All internet-based firms listed on a Unites States exchange are included. Data
presented include mean and median of Offer price (per share), Secondary shares sold in the offering as
a percentage of total number of shares offered, Size of Offering, Market value of Equity of firm 4 weeks
post-IPO, Percentage of sample that was backed by Venture capitalists prior to IPO, Percentage of
sample that was backed by a Private Equity firm prior to IPO, IPO Lead Underwriter rank, Number of
Co-Managers in the IPO, Number of days in lockup period, and Lockup period expiration return.

Mean
Observations

Median
210

Offer Price (per share)

10.22

9.60

Offer Size ($ Million)

320.00

62.30

% Secondary Shares Offered

27.58%

22.30%

1730

98.30

Underpricing

29.30%

17.22%

% Venture backed

36.19%

% Venture exit

13.81%

% PE backed

32.86%

% PE exit

16.19%

Market Value of Equity ($ Million)

Lead Underwriter Rank

5.73

6.1

Number of Co-Managers

1.89

0

Days in lockup expiration

163.92

180

Lockup Expiration return

8.60%

9.86%
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Table 2:
Summary statistics of Insider Shareholdings, Research Coverage and
Insider selling data
The sample consists of 210 firms that completed an initial public offering (IPO) between January 2007
and December 2016. All internet-based firms listed on a Unites States exchange are included. Data
presented in Panel A includes mean and median of shares and options held by insiders as a percentage
of shares outstanding. Panel B presents the summary statistics of firms with and without research
coverage in the IBES database. The mean and median of number of mentions, number of buy
recommendations and number of analysts covering the stock from the time of the IPO to one month
following the lockup expiration are presented for firms with some level of research coverage. Panel C
comprises of Insider selling data collected two months prior to two months following lockup expiration.

Mean

Median

Percent shares held by insiders

57.92%

66.21%

Percent options held by insiders

5.77%

4.89%

Panel A: Insiders Shareholdings Data

Panel B: Research Coverage
Firms with no research coverage

8.10%

Firms with research coverage

91.90%

Total number of IBES Mentions

52.95

35.00

Total number of Buy Recommendations

49.73

32.00

Number of Analysts

6.08

5.00

Panel C: Insider selling around lockup expiration
Firms with no insider selling at lockup expiration

8.57%

Firms with selling at lockup expiration

91.43%

Shares sold as a percentage of outstanding stock
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9.58%

10.83%

Table 3:
Pre-IPO Insider Ownership and IPO Underpricing
The sample consists of 210 firms that completed an initial public offering (IPO) between January 2007
and December 2016. All internet-based firms listed on a Unites States exchange are included. The
dependent variable is a measure of underpricing, that is, the offer price to close return on the offering’s
first day. The Independent variables are Insider stock and options ownership measured as a percentage
of outstanding stock, secondary shares measured as a percentage of total shares offered in the IPO, Log
of Offer Size, Rank of lead IPO underwriter, Number of co-managers, and Indicator variables for VC
backed firms, PE backed firms, and Subsequent equity offerings. A calendar year indicator is included
to control for any time effects and changes in the IPO and financial markets.

Underpricing
Intercept
Percent management shares held
Percent management options held
Secondary shares at IPO
Venture Capital backed IPO indicator
Venture Capital exit IPO indicator
Private Equity backed IPO indicator
Private Equity exit IPO indicator
Log of IPO Offer Size
Number of Co-Managers
Lead Underwriter Rank
Subsequent Equity offering indicator
Calendar year dummies
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-8.489
[0.828]
0.443
[0.001]
0.219
[0.753]
-0.126
[0.225]
-0.029
[0.859]
-0.049
[0.736]
-0.002
[0.986]
0.102
[0.512]
-0.003
[0.848]
-0.004
[0.792]
-0.008
[0.532]
0.062
[0.477]
0.004
[0.824]

Table 4:
Research Coverage and IPO Underpricing partitioned by level of
Underpricing
The sample consists of 210 firms that completed an initial public offering (IPO) between January 2007
and December 2016. All internet-based firms listed on a Unites States exchange are included. The
sample is partitioned into four groups based on Aggarwal et al (2001) IPO underpricing cutoff levels;
Cold IPOs have an underpricing of 0% or below, Cool IPOs are underpriced between 0 – 10%, Hot
IPOs are underpriced between 10 – 60% and extra-hot IPOs have an underpricing greater than 60%.
Data presented include number of observations, mean and median of Number of IBES Mentions and
Number of Analysts making recommendations from the time of the IPO through one month following
the lockup expiration period, and lockup sales two months prior to two months following lockup period
expiration as a percentage of total shares outstanding.

Cold IPO

Cool IPO

Hot IPO

UP < 0%

0% < UP <10%

10% < UP < 60%

Extra Hot IPO
UP > 60%

Mean

Mean

Mean

Mean

Median
68

Observations

Median
19

Median
97

Median
26

Number of IBES
Mentions

5.47

5.00

10.14

9.60

56.04

57.56

162.28

130.22

Number of
Analysts making
recommendations

2.00

2.00

5.68

7.00

7.67

7.18

8.15

8.00

3.30%

1.56%

Lockup Sales at
Expiration

9.70% 10.45% 11.59% 12.78% 11.84% 13.16%
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Table 5:
Research Coverage and IPO Underpricing by Heckman 2-stage estimation
Panel A: First stage estimates
The first stage model is a Probit model explaining when the dependent variable in the second stage in
missing. The sample consists of 210 firms that completed an initial public offering (IPO) between
January 2007 and December 2016. All internet-based firms listed on a Unites States exchange are
included. The dependent variable is an indicator for a firm’s mention in the IBES Database, equaling 1
if the firm was even mentioned from the time of the IPO through one month following the lockup
expiration period, or 0 otherwise. The independent variables are Log of Market Capitalization measured
four weeks following the IPO, Lead Underwriter rank, and Indicator variables for VC and PE backed
firms. A calendar year indicator is included to control for any time effects and changes in the IPO and
financial markets.

Research Coverage Indicator Variable
Intercept

-7.027
[0.742]

Log of Market Value of Equity post-IPO

-0.005
[0.417]

Lead Underwriter Rank
Venture Capital backed IPO indicator
Venture Capital exit IPO indicator
Private Equity backed IPO indicator
Private Equity exit IPO indicator
Calendar year dummies
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0.005
[0.464]
-0.027
[0.667]
-0.082
[0.304]
0.039
[0.553]
-0.014
[0.865]
0.004
[0.708]

Panel B: Second stage estimates
The second stage is a linear estimation and only includes 193 firms, which have some level of research
coverage. The dependent variable is Research Coverage, defined as the total number of mentions in the
IBES database from the time of the IPO through one month following the lockup expiration period.
Independent variables include Underpricing (measured as the return from offer to first day close),
Underpricing squared, Log of Market Capitalization measured four weeks following the IPO, Lead
Underwriter rank, Number of Co-Managers, Turnover (measured as the average amount of trading
volume in the first month as a percentage of shares offered in the IPO), and Indicators for VC and PE
backed firms. The inverse mills ratio estimated in the first stage is also included as an independent
variable. A calendar year indicator is included to control for any time effects and changes in the IPO
and financial markets.

Number of IBES Database Mentions
Intercept

5.973
[0.275]

Underpricing

-3.631
[0.004]

Underpricing Squared
Log of Market Value of Equity post-IPO
Lead Underwriter Rank
Number of Co-Managers
Inverse Mills ratio
Venture Capital backed IPO indicator
Venture Capital exit IPO indicator
Private Equity backed IPO indicator
Private Equity exit IPO indicator
Turnover
Calendar year dummies

31

-0.690
[0.021]
3.428
[0.260]
-3.196
[0.280]
0.061
[0.544]
-1.799
[0.260]
0.018
[0.302]
-0.057
[0.271]
-0.027
[0.274]
-0.011
[0.249]
-0.264
[0.321]
-2.693
[0.277]

Table 6:
Research Coverage and Lockup Period expiration returns
The sample consists of 210 firms that completed an initial public offering (IPO) between January 2007
and December 2016. All internet-based firms listed on a Unites States exchange are included. The
dependent variable is Lockup period expiration return. The independent variables are Number of
mentions in the IBES Database, Log of Market Capitalization measured four weeks following the IPO,
Lead Underwriter rank, Number of Co-Managers, Indicator variables for VC and PE backed firms,
Research Coverage indicator, Underpricing (measured as the return from offer to first day close), and
Underpricing Squared. A calendar year indicator 𝜇. is included to control for any time effects and
changes in the IPO and financial markets.

Returns at Lockup Expiration
Intercept
Number of mentions in IBES database
Log of Market Value of Equity post-IPO
Lead Underwriter Rank
Number of Co-Managers
Venture Capital backed IPO indicator
Venture Capital exit IPO indicator
Private Equity backed IPO indicator
Private Equity exit IPO indicator
Research Coverage indicator
Underpricing
Underpricing Squared
Calendar year dummies
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-2.086
[0.513]
0.003
[0.001]
-0.005
[0.951]
0.005
[0.599]
-0.002
[0.139]
0.0194
[0.042]
-0.008
[0.944]
-0.002
[0.876]
-0.002
[0.878]
0.066
[0.032]
0.015
[0.268]
-0.001
[0.723]
0.001
[0.513]

Table 7:
Research Coverage and Insider selling at Lockup expiration
The sample consists of 210 firms that completed an initial public offering (IPO) between January 2007 and
December 2016. All internet-based firms listed on a Unites States exchange are included. The model is estimated
in two ways: a Logit specification and a Tobit specification. In the Logit specification, the dependent variable
equals one if there are any stock sales by insiders in the period from two months prior to two months following
the lockup expiration. In the Tobit specification, the dependent variable is defined as the amount of stock sold by
insiders in in the period from two months prior to two months following the lockup expiration as a percentage of
total shares outstanding Independent variables include Returns at lockup expiration, Number of Mentions in the
IBES database, Research Coverage indicator, Log of Market Capitalization measured four weeks following the
IPO, Lead Underwriter rank, Number of Co-Managers, Indicator variables for VC and PE backed firms,
Underpricing (measured as the return from offer to first day close), Underpricing Squared and a Percentage of
base salary and cash bonus as a percentage of executive compensation package.

Insider Selling at Lockup Expiration

Logit
-0.851
[0.952]
0.008
[0.028]
0.348
[0.0262]
0.181
[0.780]
-0.007
[0.131]
0.003
[0.943]
0.029
[0.509]
0.026
[0.619]
-0.026
[0.555]
-0.025
[0.658]
0.747
[0.023]
0.106
[0.170]
-0.023
[0.197]
-0.997
[0.215]
0.005
[0.944]

Intercept
Number of mentions in IBES database
Returns at Lockup expiration
Log of Market Value of Equity post-IPO
Lead Underwriter Rank
Number of Co-Managers
Venture Capital backed IPO indicator
Venture Capital exit IPO indicator
Private Equity backed IPO indicator
Private Equity exit IPO indicator
Research Coverage indicator
Underpricing
Underpricing Squared
Measure of Insider liquidity
Calendar year dummies
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Tobit
-4.845
[0.153]
0.011
[0.002]
0.241
[0.579]
-0.321
[0.330]
-0.001
[0.487]
0.002
[0.967]
0.031
[0.798]
0.072
[0.953]
-0.016
[0.878]
0.013
[0.340]
0.614
[0.039]
0.098
[0.036]
-0.014
[0.214]
-0.813
[0.804]
0.002
[0.154]

Appendix I: Variables and Descriptions
Variable

Description

Effective Date of IPO

Refers to the date when shares become available for sale in an
initial public offering

Executive Options Ownership

Insider ownership of options as a percentage of shares
outstanding, prior to IPO

Executive Stock Ownership

Insider ownership of stock as a percentage of shares
outstanding, prior to IPO

IBES Analysts

Number of analysts following the firm from the effective date of
the IPO to one month following the IPO (Data from IBES
database)

IBES Buy Recommendations

Number of times an analyst posted a buy recommendation for a
firm from the effective date of the IPO to one month following
the IPO (Data from IBES database)

IBES Mentions

Number of times a firm has been mentioned in the IBES
database from the effective date of the IPO to one month
following the IPO

IBES Research Coverage indicator

Indicator variable representing if a firm has been mentioned in
the IBES database from the time of the IPO to one month
following the IPO

Insider Liquidity

Base salary and cash bonus as a percentage of executive
compensation package, prior to the IPO

Insider Sales indicator

Indicator variable representing if a firm had insiders sales two
months prior to two months after the IPO

Insider Sales

Insider sales as a percentage of shares outstanding two months
prior to two months after the IPO

Lead Underwriter Rank

Rank of lead underwriter of the IPO according to the CarterManaster rankings

Lockup Period

The amount of time following an IPO where large shareholders,
such as company executives are restricted from selling their
shares (measured in number of days)

Lockup Period Expiration return

Return between the time of the IPO to the end of the lockup
period

Market Value of Equity

Market Value of Equity of the firm four weeks after the
Effective date of the IPO

Number of Co-Managers

Number of firms assisting the lead underwriter during the
underwriting process of the IPO
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Appendix I: Variables and Descriptions (contd.)
Variable

Description

Offer Price

Price of each share offered in the IPO (Size of IPO Offered
divided by the total number of shares offered)

Offer Size

Size of the IPO Offering

Private Equity Backed

Indicator variable for firms who received funding from a
Private Equity firm prior to IPO

Private Equity Exit

Indicator variable for IPOs that were assisted by Private
Equity firms at the time of going public

Secondary Shares

Number of shares of current shareholders being sold in the
IPO as a percentage of total number of shares offered in the
IPO

Subsequent Equity Offering

Indicator variable representing if a firm decides to have a
subsequent equity offering after the initial public offering

Turnover

Average amount of trading volume in first month as a
percentage of shares offered in the IPO

Underpricing

Return from offer price to first day close price

Venture Capital Backed

Indicator variable for firms who received funding from a
Venture Capital firm prior to IPO

Venture Capital Exit

Indicator variable for IPOs that were assisted by Venture
Capital firms at the time of going public
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